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ABSTRACT
In order to liquidate a large position in an asset, investors face a tradeoff between price
volatility and market impact. The classical approach to this problem is to model volatil-
ity via a Brownian motion, and separate price impact into its permanent and temporary
components. In this thesis, we consider two variations of the Chriss-Almgren model for
temporary price impact. The first model investigates the infinite-horizon optimal liquida-
tion problem in a market with float-dependent, nonlinear temporary price impact. The
value function of the investors basket and the optimal strategy are characterized in terms
of classical solutions of nonlinear parabolic partial differential equations. Depending on
the price impact parameters, liquidation may require finite or infinite time. The second
model considers time-varying market depth, in that intense trading increases temporary
price-impact, which otherwise reverts to a long-term level. We find the optimal execution
policy in a finite horizon for an investor with constant risk aversion, and derive the solution
using calculus of variation techniques. Although the model potentially allows for price ma-
nipulation strategies, these policies are never optimal. We study the non time-constrained
case as a limit to the finite-horizon case and explain the solution through a quasi-linear
PDE.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Literature review
Financial institutions have a substantial investment position in different assets. Due to
external regulatory issues, from time to time these institutions may face to be required to
liquidate a substantial position in a short time. As an example, after a downgrade in an
asset’s credit rating a mutual fund is no longer able to hold that asset and has to liquidate
his entire position in that asset. The liquidation strategy of a large position has a significant
impact on its execution price. An optimal policy needs to trade off three conflicting goals.
First, when a large position is earmarked for liquidation, it is essentially considered as a
large source or risk that lacks sufficient reward, to be sold as quickly as possible. Second,
in a market with limited depth intense selling leads to more unfavorable prices, calling for
slow liquidation. Third, as the market absorbs the liquidating position, market depth can
decrease because of asymmetric information or predatory trading.
Prices are established in the exchange, through the interaction and balance between
supply and demand. On one side, there are market participants who are willing to buy at
certain prices and other participant(who could be the same as the buyers) that are willing
to sell at certain prices. These bid and offer orders (limit orders) are submitted to the
exchange and recorded continuously in time in the limit orderbook. In this environment,
the observed price in the market for a trader who wants to buy is the smallest ask quote in
the book and the greatest available bid quote for a trader who wants to sell. The consistent
rebalances in bid-ask orders following by the activity of the other market participants is
2called volatility of the price. This usually is treated as an exogenous factor1. In order to
make a transaction, each order needs to be price matched with order from the other side of
the orderbook. Hence, the execution of limit orders is uncertain and can’t be an option for
a trader with time constraint. The alternative for such traders are market orders. After
submitting a market order of size h any available limit order on the other side of the book
with the highest price will match, if the number of shares requested in the market order
be higher than the number of available share on the highest price, the second highest price
will be used to fill the rest of the order. Hence, after submission of a market order, the
execution price can be less than the observed price.
In facing such environment, the trader has to maximize the outcome of his trading
activity by picking the right time and size of market orders optimally. This difference
between observed price and execution price is called price impact. This acts endogenously
and explains how after investor’s market order the bid-ask orders region reshapes and
affects the future price.
In the past three decades the optimal execution with limited depth has developed in
several directions, starting from the seminal work of Kyle (1985) on a linear temporary im-
pact. Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2001), building on the intuition in Stoll (1989), distinguish
between temporary and permanent price impact and study the mean-variance optimal liq-
uidation with linear impact, in which the lower risk of early liquidation trades off the costs
of a higher selling rate. Huberman and Stanzl (2004) prove that, to exclude arbitrage prof-
its through price-manipulation, permanent impact must be linear. Gatheral (2010) finds
necessary conditions to exclude price manipulation in a large class of price-impact models.
Perold and Salomon Jr (1991) and the empirical work of Obizhaeva (2011) suggest that
the linearity of temporary price impact is unrealistic. Also Almgren (2003) studies optimal
liquidation for nonlinear, power-type impact. Schied and Schneborn (2009) formulate the
problem in the continuous time and find the optimal liquidation strategy for infinite horizon
under linear temporary impact with variable risk aversion, and Scho¨neborn (2011) extends
1In some models like Almgren (2003) the volatility increases as a function of trading intensity
3the analysis to the nonlinear case and for several risky assets. Another way of addressing
the execution problem is through transient impact models. In this type of models, a trade
not only effects its own execution price but also its effect will be carried over into the
future trades. Bouchaud et al. (2004) used the trades and quote data from the Paris stock
market and measured this decay through the autocorrelation of trade signs. They argued
that market impact is temporary and that it decays as a power-law. In a more extensive
work, Gatheral (2010) addressed a larger variety of decay functions and found the required
conditions to address the issue of price manipulation. This idea got a great recognition in
the context of limit orderbook through the work of Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) where they
explained price impact as a results of the dynamic of the limit-order book. In this context,
Alfonsi et al. (2010) consider books with more flexible shapes, showing their connection
with nonlinear price impact. Predoiu et al. (2011) further generalize the shape of the order
book, including both discrete and continuous components. While these can accommodate
a rich dynamics of the limit-order book, the corresponding liquidation problems are rarely
tractable, in contrast to the price-impact models in reduced form, which are amenable to
stochastic control techniques, as in Schied and Schneborn (2009).
In this thesis, we investigate the interplay between risk and price impact in deriving
the optimal liquidation policy, under two new price impact models. In both models, we
use the Bachelier model, to describe the asset price in the absence of investor’s trading
activity. For market impact, we use the Almgren and Chriss (1999) framework and divide
the market impact into two parts of permanent and temporary impacts, where former
shows how the increase in the number of sold shares moves the price in a long run, and the
latter demonstrates the effect in the execution price through intense trading. The novelty
of our model in the reduced form literature is that the temporary price impact is dynamic.
In the first model, temporary price impact can be a function of past trades, as to account
for the limited ability of the market to fully absorb a trade, and possibly for the size of
the trader. We also allow for temporary impact to increase in the size of the residual
position, or float dependence, to reflect the potential worsening of liquidity in the late
4stages of liquidation. A priori, this feature encourages a quicker and earlier liquidation to
preempt deterioration in liquidity, but it also implies slower trading rate at the late stages
of liquidation. A posteriori, we find the former effect to be modest and the second one
to be significant, which suggests that the responses of liquidation strategies to anticipated
and unanticipated changes in liquidity are similar. This analysis extends previous work
of Almgren and Chriss (1999) and Schied and Schneborn (2009) on linear impact, and
Almgren (2003) on nonlinear impact, in which market depth is held constant throughout
liquidation.
In the second model, the temporary impact evolves dynamically according to the past
trades. This change accounts for the fact that the market’s depth varies subject to the
intensity of submitted orders, where high intensity trading tends to reduce the market
depth while in the absent of trading, it recovers its equilibrium position throughout time.
We find the optimal execution policy and show that unlike some choices in the old models
involving resilience, our model doesn’t allow for transaction-triggered price manipulation
strategies, i.e policies involving intermediate buying from the same stock in a liquidation
problem could not be optimal.
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to introducing the relevant models to the work in
this thesis. In particular, the model of Almgren and Chriss (1999) which is fundamental to
the construction of our own models are presented in details. Moreover, the results of Schied
and Schneborn (2009) which we generalized in our first model is explained briefly. Finally,
for the purpose of comparison and giving an intuition to our second model, we finish this
chapter by presenting some results on transient impact model.
1.2 Almgren-Chriss Model
1.2.1 Discreet path approach
In the simplest form, the finite horizon problem can be addressed via discretization. We
divide the liquidation interval [0, T ] to N subintervals of equal size τ = TN , then the
5investor has to choose optimally a sequence of quantities {ni}, representing the number
of sold shares within each interval [ti−1, ti] for i = 0, ..., N − 1 where ti = iτ such that∑N
i=1 ni = x0, where x0 is the initial number shares he has to sell. Equivalently, we can
use the sequence {xi} to denote the number of shares he’s holding after the n-th period.
In each time step price evolves according to two factors of volatility and price impact.
In reflecting these two factors, first we use a Brownian motion2 Bt in order to reflect the
effect of other traders in the outcome price in the absent of the insider. Let Z1, Z2, . . . ZN
be normal I.I.D. with mean zero and standard deviation one. Let (Ω,F , {Fi}Ni=1, P ) be the
filtered probability space on which Zi are defined
Si = Si−1 + σ
√
τZi
For price impact, we use the Almgren-Chriss model3 and divide the price impact into
two parts. First, a temporary impact reflects the temporary imbalances in supply and
demand caused by the very last trading of the investor and moving it away from the
equilibrium. Second, a permanent impact which shows the change in the equilibrium
due to trading which will last for the life of liquidation. We denote these two functions
respectively by Per(.) and Temp(.). Let’s assume the initial price of the interested security
price is S0. After each time step the observed security price evolves as follow
Si = Si−1 + σ
√
τZi − τPer(nk
τ
) (1.1)
and the execution price as
S˜i = Si − Temp(nk
τ
) (1.2)
2one could argue to use other form like geometric Brownian motion see Bertsimas and Lo (1998)
3Although older versions of this model appeared earlier in Bertsimas and Lo (1998) and Madhavan
(2000),it commonly named after Almgren and Chriss
6As a result, the revenue followed by the trading policy {ni} is
RT (X) =
N∑
i=1
niS˜i = XS0 +
N∑
i=1
(
σ
√
τZi − τPer(ni
τ
)xi
)− N∑
i=1
niTemp(
ni
τ
) (1.3)
Liquidation process usually is required to be completed in a substantially short time,
for this reason one could ignore the effect of interest rate and omit discounting factor in
evaluating the policies. The investor could be only interested in maximizing the expected
value of trading revenue. In that case, the cost due to volatility of the price will be ignored
in calculation. However, each investor have certain behavior against uncertainty risk. In
order to measure the risk, we use a risk-aversion parameter A ≥ 0, and address the optimal
execution policy for an investor who wants to maximize his mean-variance utility function
by minimizing his mean-variance utility cost
U(x) = E(x) +AV (x) (1.4)
where the expected cost E(x) and the variance cost V (x) are given by
E(x) =
N∑
i=1
τxiPer(
ni
τ
) +
N∑
i=1
niTemp(
ni
τ
) (1.5)
Var(x) =
N∑
i=1
τσ2x2i (1.6)
As a first model, in addition to the permanent price impact we use a linear function for
the temporary impact function. Let the constant λ be a linear representation of temporary
price impact. A single trade of size n induces the following impacts
Per(
n
τ
) = γ
n
τ
Temp(
n
τ
) = λ
n
τ
7Hence, the expectation of impact cost becomes
E(x) =
λ˜
τ
∑
(xi − xi−1)2 ,
where
λ˜ = λ− 1
2
γτ . (1.7)
The expected utility function U(x), constructed through V (x) via equation (1.6) and E(x)
from above is strictly convex function of the control parameters x1, . . . , xN−1 as long as
λ˜ > 0. Hence, there exists a unique global minimum which could be obtained by setting
the partial derivatives
∂U
∂xi
= 2τ
{
Aσ2xi − λ˜xi−1 − 2xi + xi+1
τ2
}
equal to zero. This is equivalent to have
1
τ2
(xi−1 − 2xi + xi+1) = κ˜2xi (1.8)
where
κ2 =
Aσ2
λ(1− γτ2λ )
Note that equation (1.8) is a linear difference equation whose solution may be written as
a combination of the exponentials exp(±κti), where κ satisfies
2
τ2
(
cosh(κτ)− 1) = κ˜2 (1.9)
In the two extreme cases, the optimal policy for minimizing only the expected cost is to
sell with constant rate XN . On the other far end, in order to only minimize the variance
the entire position has to be liquidated in the first step.
81.2.2 Price manipulation
As mentioned in the introduction, the goal in this thesis is to study the optimal execution
problem under new variations of permanent-temporary price impact models. We challenge
the validity of the current models for temporary price impact, however, we accept the
linearity assumption for the permanent price impact. The next definition and its following
theorem explain the validity of this assumption.
Definition 1 A roundtrip strategy is an order execution strategy X with X0 = XT . A
price manipulation strategy is a strategy that involve roundtrip strategy X with strictly
positive expected revenues,
E[RT (X)] > 0
Theorem 1 The Almgren-Chriss model does not admit price manipulation for all T > 0,
if the permanent impact is a linear function. i.e. Per(nτ ) = γ
n
τ where γ is a constant.
Remark 1 The inverse is not correct. A nonlinear permanent impact function could be
enough for preventing price manipulation strategies, if the temporary price impact function
be more sensitive to trading intensity and makes the roundtrip policies unfavorable.
1.2.3 Continuous path approach
In order to step into a continuous model, one could simply look at the limiting behavior
of the discreet model. Taking the limit of N → ∞ and τ → 0 yield to have λ˜ → λ and
κ˜→ κ. Therefore from the equation (1.9), the optimal path becomes
x(t) =
sinh(κ(T − t))
sinh(κT )
X
Now let’s discuss the Almgren-Chriss model in continuos time framework with a general
function for temporary price impact. For the control variable, instead of the number of
sold shares in each step, we use the intensity of selling i.e. ξt = −x′(t) . In addition to the
end point behavior
∫ T
0 ξtdt = x0, we need to assume that the liquidation paths are almost
9surely differentiable. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈R, P ) be the filtered probability space on which the
Brownian motion Bt is defined. Similar to equations (1.1) and (1.2) the observed price and
the effective price become
S˜t = S0 + σ
∫ t
0
B(s)ds−
∫ t
0
g(ξ(s))ds (1.10)
St = S˜t − h(ξ(t)) (1.11)
Here, we used the functions g(.) and h(.) , respectively for continuous version of the discreet
permanent and temporary price impact functions Per(.) and Temp(.). Under this set up,
for the expected cost and the variance are given by
E[x] =
∫ T
0
x(t)g(ξ(t)) + ξ(t)h(ξ(t))dt
Var[x] =
∫ T
0
σ2x2(t)dt
And therefore the minimization question for U(x) in (1.4) will be a standard problem in
calculus of variations
min
x(t)
∫ T
0
F (x(t), x′(t))dt
with
F (x, p) = xg(−p)− ph(−p) +Aσ2x2
Then the optimal solution solve the Euler-Lagrange equation
d
dt
{
F (x, p) + pFp(x, p)
}
= 0
Which for linear permanent impact function reduces to solving
B(ξ(t))−B(ξ(T )) = Aσ2x2 (1.12)
10
where
B(p) = p2
d
dp
(
h(p)
)
(1.13)
As an example for power law price impact functions h(p) = λpα
x(t) =

(
1 + 1−α1+α
t
T ?
)− 1+α
1−α
0 < α < 1
exp
(
− tT ?
)
α = 1(
1− α−1α+1 tT ?
)α+1
α−1
α > 1
where
T ? =
(
αλXα−10
Aσ2
) 1
α+1
As we mention from Huberman and Stanzl (2004) results in Theorem 1, the linearity
assumption for permanent price impact is essential. In fact, one could interpret the per-
manent impact as the memory of the market and therefore tying it to the number of sold
shares by linearity, makes this assumption natural. However, surprisingly we observe that
with linearity, the effect of permanent price impact vanishes completely in determining the
optimal strategy via equations (1.12) and (1.13). This unpleasant results is the intuition
behind the model, we propose in the next two chapters.
Before ending this section, it’s important to mention that now that we use integral
frequently in continuous framework, we always need to add integrability to our assumptions.
We use the term Admissibility for this matter.
1.3 Schied-Schoneborn model
The problem of finding optimal execution policy can be regarded either as static or dynamic
decision making problem. In the former one, the investor could decide ξt at the starting
time, and in the latter one, the investor decides ξt using all the available information a
time t, i.e. ξt ∈ Ft. In the previous examples, the optimal policies we found were all
deterministic, i.e. the new information doesn’t improve the optimal policy, unless the
11
estimation of the parameters changes throughout the liquidation. This feature is mainly
due to the choice of mean-variance utility function. In order to fix this issue, one could
either consider an investor with non-constant risk aversion or look on other form of objective
measure from portfolio choice theory.4
Definition 2 Risk aversion function, measures the behavior of the investor against risk as
a function of his wealth. It is defined via
A(R) = −uRR(R)
uR(R)
For technical reasons later in the proofs, we are required to add the following boundedness
assumption on the risk aversion
0 < Amin ≤ A(R) ≤ Amax <∞
Notice the reason we denote the risk aversion by A, which is similar to mean-variance utility
function notation, is that in the case of constant risk aversion function the two concepts
are identical.
In this section, we use a utility function with arbitrary risk aversion function, and the
objective is to maximize the expected-utility of his final cash flow
maxE[u(RT (X))]
We will see that in this framework, an investor with non constant risk aversion function
choose a dynamic decision making behavior. For instance, an investor with high proportion
of risky asset could be more sensitive to change in the price. Hence, within this framework,
the unpredicted future movement of the price changes the behavior of investor; investor
might react actively or passively to the favorable or unfavorable movement of the risky
asset’s price.
4such as, terminal wealth, consumption utility, long run and value at risk measures
12
With this disscusion, it’s clear that in the first step we need to distinguish between the
risky and riskless part of the portfolio. Let’s denote the number of riskless asset held by
investor at time t via rt and by Xt number of risky asset he holds and wants to liquidate.
The nominal total portfolio value of the investor at time t
R˜t = rt +XtPt
We’ve already seen that in the case on linear price impact, the cost associated with the
permanent price impact is fixed and inevitable, hence after subtracting the cost associated
with permanent impact, we define the adjusted nominal value as follows
Rt = rt +XtPt − 1
2
γX2t
Due to the Markov nature of the underlying model, we assume that the value function
maxE[u(RT (X))] can be represented by function ν which takes X, R and the remaining
time τ = T − t as inputs. This type of assumption, requires us to give a verification
argument to prove that such function is indeed the true value function.
ν(X,R, τ)
Following any admissible policy ξ(t) = −X˙(t) in a market with a temporary impact function
like f(ξ), the portfolio value evolves as follow
dR = σXdBt − ξf(ξ)dt (1.14)
The value function ν(X,R, τ) has the following dynamics
dν = νRdR+ νXdX + ντdτ +
1
2
νRRd〈R,R〉
13
after substituting (1.14) in the last equation, the optimal policy can be obtained by solving
the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
νt =
1
2
σ2X2νRR + νR(−f(c)c) + νXc (1.15)
with boundary condition
lim
τ→0
ν(X,R, τ) =
 u(R) x = 0−∞ x 6= 0
The initial condition reflects the constraint for finishing the liquidation by terminal
time, i.e.
∫ T
0 ξ(t)dt = x0 by penalizing the liquidations that have not been completed in
time. Solving this problem for a general utility functions is difficult. Nevertheless, it can
be discussed in two special cases.
In the case of constant risk aversion utility function, this will be equivalent to the
mean-variance utility function which we already discussed in the previous section.
Another way of simplifying the (1.15) is to consider an infinite horizon problem. By
dropping the time constraint, the HJB equation of ν(X,R) takes a simpler form
min
c
{−1
2
σ2x2νRR + λνRc
2 + νxc} = 0
equipped with boundary condition ν(0, r) = u(r). Thanks to the risk component of value
function, the investor will still tend to liquidate his position, and we don’t need to worry
about any penalizing like the general case.
Since the model we present in the first chapter and its proof extend this result of
Scheid-Schoneborn, we skip the proof and suffice to present their results. The optimal
14
policy solution to this HJB equation is given by
c(X,R) = c˜(X2, R)X
Where c˜ is solution to PDE
c˜Y = −3
2
λc˜c˜R +
σ2
4c˜
c˜RR
with initial value
c˜(0, R) =
√
σ2A(R)
2λ
The value function will be obtained as ω˜(X2, R) where ω(X,R) = ω˜ is the solution to the
following ODE
ω˜Y = −λc˜ω˜R
with initial value
ω˜(0, R) = u(R)
As mentioned earlier, at the end, a verification argument is required to prove that ω the
solution to the HJB equation is indeed equal to the expected return of the liquidation
policy maxE[u(RT (X))].
1.4 Transient price impact model
We end this chapter, by introducing the transient price impact model. The models we in-
troduce in the next chapters are inspired by this model as another alternative for improving
the temporary-permanent price impact model. The philosophy behind this model is that
the Markov environment employed in the previous models is crucial in solving the execu-
tion problem, however, in a perfect model this assumption need to be dropped. Consider
the following price dynamic
St = S0 + σBt +
∫ t
0
h(ξ(s))G(t− s)ds (1.16)
15
where h is the transient price impact function and G a positive and decreasing function
which demonstrate the reduction in the effect of past trades over time. Under this model,
the trading cost is
C[x] =
∫ T
0
ξ(t)
(∫ t
0
h(ξ(s))G(t− s)ds
)
dt
It worths to mention that in fact the model of Obizhaeva Wang (2013) as one of
the first examples of this model with linear transient price impact and exponential decay
function, was based on the study of such dynamic for the shape of limit orderbook and then
its connection to the transient model on the level of price impact was observed. In fact
studying the optimal execution problem on the level of dynamic of shape of limit orderbook
gives more insight to the observed price dynamic and enables us to explain market price
impact realistically.
One can consider the Almgren-Chriss model as a special case of this model. By using
a linear function for h in the current set up of (3.48), the temporary price impact im-
posed by ξtdt could be regarded as ξ(G(0) − limt→0+ G(t))dt, and the permanent impact
is ξ limt→∞G(t)dt.
Although this model is quite powerful, it could cause some irregularity issue. Here
we outline the study of Gatheral (2010) on the choices for the price impact and decay
functions which has identified a vast majority of the choices for this model which admit
price manipulation.
Proposition 1 (Gatheral) In a transient price impact model if the decay function G(t)
be finite and continuous at t = 0 and the transient price impact function h : R → R be
nonlinear. Then the model admits price manipulation.
In addition to price manipulation, Alfonsi et al. (2012) introduced another form of
arbitrage as follow, which limits the choices for decay and price impact functions even
further. In the following we present the definition of this form of arbitrage and accompany
it with a proposition to demonstrate a set of models which admit it.
16
Definition 3 (Transaction-triggered price manipulation) A market impact model ad-
mits transaction-triggered price manipulation if the expected revenues of a sell (buy) pro-
gram can be increased by intermediate buy (sell) trades. That is, there exists X0, T > 0,
and a corresponding order execution strategy ξ for which
E[RT (ξ
?)] > sup{E(RT (ξ))
∣∣ξ is a monoton order execution strategy for X0 and T}
Proposition 2 The transient price impact model (1.16) admits transaction-triggered price
manipulation, if there exist s, t > 0, such that G(0)−G(s) < G(t)−G(t+ s)
Although despite all these restriction, the transient price impact model can host a great
flexibility in allowing a great number of models, yet unlike reduced forms of price impact
model like Almgren-Chriss’s, the corresponding liquidation problems are rarely tractable.
In this thesis, we tried to address this issue by introducing two new form of generalization
for the Almgren-Chriss model. These new models allow us to use the older machinery to
derive the solution to the optimization problem while keeping some feature of transient
price impact model.
Chapter 2
Float dependent model
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we derive optimal liquidation policies in a model with permanent and
temporary, potentially nonlinear impact. We also allow for temporary impact to increase
in the size of the residual position, or float dependence, to reflect the potential worsening
of liquidity in the late stages of liquidation. A priori, this feature encourages a quicker and
earlier liquidation to preempt deterioration in liquidity, but it also implies slower trading
rate at the late stages of liquidation. A posteriori, we find the former effect to be modest
and the second one to be significant, which suggests that the responses of liquidation
strategies to anticipated and unanticipated changes in liquidity are similar. This analysis
extends previous work of Almgren and Chriss (1999) and Schied and Schneborn (2009) on
linear impact, and Almgren (2003) on nonlinear impact, in which market depth is held
constant throughout liquidation.
After introducing the price-impact model, admissible policies, and the value function,
section 2 presents the main result and motivates it with a heuristic argument. Section 3
contains all the proofs, based on a transformation that tracks the trader’s risk aversion,
and leads to a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB) equation. Finally, we show
that the proposed function is indeed the value function of the liquidation problem.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 The Market
Consider a large investor who needs to liquidate his position in a risky asset. We suppose
that the investor can only trade between his risky asset and the risk free asset. We assume
that the price of the risky asset follows the Bachelier model
Pt = P0 + σBt, (2.1)
where Bt is the standard Brownian motion, the positive constant σ is the volatility of the
unaffected stock price and P0 is the initial price. With the possibility of getting negative
value for the price, this model might seem to be unrealistic. However, since in reality the
liquidation process usually occur in a window of couple days and as we will see our optimal
policy almost liquidate the entire position in a very short time, hence the possibility of
facing negative prices during the largest part of the position is neglectable. 1
The investor chooses a trading strategy that we describe by Xt, the number of shares
he is holding at time t. Assuming Xt to be absolutely continuous, its derivative X˙t exists
almost everywhere and
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
X˙sds. (2.2)
Due to insufficient liquidity in the market, the investor’s trading rate X˙t moves the market
price. To describe the market impact, we use a model which extends the model of Alm-
gren and Chriss (1999). This includes a permanent price impact which affects the price
independent of the trading strategy of the investor, we denote it by Per(Xt). Moreover,
there exist a temporary price impact which only affects the infinitesimal orders relative to
1Bertsimas and Lo (1998) formulated the liquidation problem by using the geometric Brownian motion
for the unaffected price to rule negative prices.
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the insensitivity of trade and vanishes instantaneously, we denote it by Tem(X, X˙). From
Theorem 1 of Huberman and Stanzl (2004), in order to rule out any price manipulation
strategies the permanent price impact has to be a linear function of trading rate. We
use the constant γ to demonstrate the permanent price impact parameter. For temporary
impact we use the non-linear market impact model of Scho¨neborn (2011) with α > 0, and
generalize it by a float-dependent factor q(X) which is bounded away from zero
Tem(Xt, X˙t) = λX˙t
α
q(Xt)
The float-dependent factor allows the market price impact to vary in the course of liqui-
dation. To model potentially worsening market depth, we focus on decreasing functions
for q(x) which are bounded, but results remain valid for any q(x) that allows the existence
of an admissible path (Definition 4). Later on, we study in detail q(x) of power type to
obtain closed-form solutions. With q(x) = 1 this model recovers Scho¨neborn (2011).
In summary, under the above assumptions the effective execution price is
Pt = P0 + σBt + γ(Xt −X0) + λq(Xt)|X˙t|α−1X˙t (2.3)
2.2.2 Optimal Policy
The investor wants to maximize the expected utility of his final cash position. Holding
initially r units of cash and X0 units of risky asset, his cash position at time t under the
policy parametrized by ξ(t) := −X˙(t) is
Rt(ξ) = r +
∫ t
0
ξsPsds
Using equation (2.3) and integration by parts
Rt(ξ) = r + P0X0 − γ
2
X20 + σ
∫ t
0
Xs(ξ)dBs − λ
∫ t
0
ξ1+αs q(Xs(ξ))ds
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Figure 2.1: Optimal policy for the fixed parameters are σ = X0 = λ0 = 1 and β = 0. The
bold curve represent the case where α = 0.3, the dashed curve represent the case where
α = 0.6 and the thin line represent Schied’s model with α = 1
−
(
P0Xt(ξ) +
γ
2
[Xt(ξ)
2 − 2X0Xt(ξ)] + σXt(ξ)Bt
)
(2.4)
Definition 4 Denote by X the set of admissible trading strategies, all the progressively
measurable processes ξ(t) := −X˙(t) for which
i)
∫ t
0 q(Xt)|ξ|1+αs ds <∞ for all t > 0.
ii) Xt(ω) is bounded uniformly in t and ω with upper and lower bounds that may depend
on the choice of ξ.
Moreover, we denote by X1 the set of liquidation strategies, all the admissible trading
strategies which furthermore satisfy
iii) E[
∫∞
0 (X
ξ
s )2ds] <∞
iv) lim
t→∞(X
ξ
t )
2t ln ln t = 0
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As an example, a liquidation policy which decreases the numbers of asset exponentially
belongs to X1 and consequently to X . In fact we’ll see that the optimal policy that we
obtain later on in Theorem 2 is of this type.
These technical restrictions are inconsequential for applications. The first assumption
ensures that the investor’s loss is bounded over a finite period of time, while the second
condition requires that the number of shares held is bounded.
The last two assumptions guarantee that Rt defined above converges P-a.s. as t goes to
infinity. Therefore, for a liquidation policy ξ ∈ X1 the final cash position is
Rξ∞ := lim
t→∞Rt(ξ)
a.s.
= r + P0X0 − γ
2
X20 + σ
∫ ∞
0
Xs(ξ)dBs − λ
∫ ∞
0
|ξs|1+αq(Xt(ξ))ds
(2.5)
The investor wants to maximize the expected utility of his final cash position E[u(Rξ∞)].
This plausibly depends on the number of shares and the current portfolio value
Rt = r + P0X0 − γ
2
X20 + σ
∫ t
0
Xs(ξ)dBs − λ
∫ t
0
|ξs|1+αq(Xt(ξ))ds (2.6)
which consists of the investor’s current cash position obtained through the policy ξ and
the nominal value of his position in the risky asset at the current market price minus the
loss from permanent impact. If the trader sells all the risky assets, the portfolio value
becomes equal to the cash position. Thus, defining the value function for X1 boils down to
maximizing the expected utility of the final portfolio value
ν1(X0, R0) := sup
ξ∈X1
E[u(Rξ∞)] (2.7)
2.2.3 Statement of Main Result
Theorem 2
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i) The value function ν in the optimal execution problem is the classical solution of the
following Hamiltion-Jacobi-Bellman equation
min
c
[
− 1
2
σ2X2νRR + λνR|c|1+αq(X) + νXc
]
= 0 (2.8)
with the boundary condition
ν(0, R) = u(R) ∀R ∈ R (2.9)
ii) The a.s. unique optimal policy is
ξˆ := c(X ξˆ, Rξˆ) =
( −νX
λ(α+ 1)q(X)νR
) 1
α
(2.10)
iii) The optimal strategy can be written as
c(X,R) := c˜(Q(X), R)
1
αX
2
α+1 q(X)
−1
α+1 (2.11)
where
Q(X) :=
∫ X
0
(α+ 1)z
2α
α+1 q(z)
1
α+1dz (2.12)
and c˜ is the unique solution to the PDE
c˜Y = −2α+ 1
α+ 1
λc˜c˜R +
σ2
2(α+ 1)c˜
1
α
c˜RR (2.13)
with initial condition
c˜(0, R) =
(
A(R)σ2
2αλ
) α
α+1
. (2.14)
Corollary 1 For an investor with constant risk aversion A, the optimal liquidation policy
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Figure 2.2: Optimal policy when q(X) = δ(X0 −X) + 1. Fixed parameters are σ = X0 =
A = σ = 1 and λ = 0.02. The bold curve represents the case where δ = 2, the dashed
curve represents the case where δ = 10 and the thin curve represents Schied’s model with
δ = 0
is deterministic and given by
ξ(X,R) =
(
Aσ2X2
2αλq(X)
) 1
α+1
Corollary 2 For the power specification q(X) = Xβ, under optimal liquidation policy an
investor with constant risk aversion is able to liquidate his position completely in a finite
time if and only if α+ β > 1. In this case, the liquidation terminates at time
α+ 1
α+ β − 1
(2λα
Aσ2
) 1
α+1X
α+β−1
α+1
0 . (2.15)
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2.2.4 Heuristic Argument
This section contains an informal derivation of the main results. Under the trading strategy
c the dynamics of X and R are given by
dX = −cdt
dR = σXdB − λ|c|α+1q(X)dt
Denote by ν(X,R) a value function which depends on the portfolio value and numbers of
risky asset. Ito’s formula yields,
dν(X,R) = νRdR+ νXdX +
1
2
νRRd〈R,R〉
=
(− λνR|c|α+1q(X)− νXc+ 1
2
σ2X2νRR
)
dt + σXνRdB
By the martingale optimality principle of stochastic control, the process ν(Xt, Rt) must be
a supermartingale for any choice of ct. Therefore, the drift of ν(Xt, Rt) can not be positive,
and will become zero for the optimal policy. Hence
max
c
{− λνR|c|α+1q(X)c− νXc+ 1
2
σ2X2νRR
}
= 0
and the optimality is achieved at its unique maximizer
c =
[ −νX
λ(α+ 1)q(X)νR
] 1
α+1
2.3 Proof of Results
This section contains the proofs of all the results of the previous section. We use the same
type of arguments as Schied and Schneborn (2009). In the first part, we show that a smooth
solution to the HJB equation exists. This is achieved by first, obtaining a solution to the
PDE (2.13) of the transformed optimal strategy c˜, then solving a transport equation with
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coefficient c˜, and ultimately use its solution to build a solution to the HJB equation. In the
last subsection, we finish the proof by presenting a verification argument, we introduce a
modified value function and use it to show that the solution to the HJB equation is indeed
equal to the original value function.
2.3.1 Properties of the differential equation
To use some auxiliary results from PDE, we need to add some assumptions on the utility
function u(R). We summarize all of the assumptions on u(R) in the following
Assumption 1 u(R) is a function in C6 and limR→∞ u(R) = 0. Moreover, its absolute
risk aversion A(R) := −uRR(R)uR(R) is bounded away from 0 and ∞, i.e.,
0 < Amin = inf
R
A(R) ≤ A(R) ≤ sup
R
A(R) = Amax <∞ (2.16)
Theorem 3 The parabolic partial differential equation
ft − d
dx
a(x, t, f, fx) + b(x, t, f, fx) = 0 (2.17)
with initial condition
f(0, x) = ψ0(x)
has a smooth solution in C2,4, if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
i) ψ0(x) is smooth C4 and bounded
ii) a and b are smooth (respectively, C3 and C2)
iii) There are constants b1, b2 ≥ 0 such that for all x and u
(
b(x, t, u, 0)− ∂a
∂x
(x, t, u, 0)
)
u ≥ −b1u2 − b2 (2.18)
iv) For all M > 0, there are constants µM ≥ νM > 0 such that for all x, t, u and p that
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are bounded in module by M
µM ≥ ∂a
∂p
(x, t, u, p) ≥ νM (2.19)
and
µM (1 + |p|)2 ≥
(
|a|+
∣∣∣∣∂a∂u
∣∣∣∣)(1 + |p|) + ∣∣∣∣∂a∂x
∣∣∣∣+ |b| (2.20)
Proof: The theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 8.1 in Chapter V of Ladyzhen-
skaya et al. (1968). In the following, we outline the last step of its proof because we shall
use it for the proof of the subsequent propositions.
The conditions of the theorem guarantee the existence of solutions fN of (2.17) on the
strip R+0 × [−N,N ] with boundary conditions
fN (0, x) = ψ0(x)
and
fN (t,±N) = ψ0(±N)
These solutions converge smoothly in C2,4 as N tends to infinity, i.e., lim
N→∞
fN = f . 
Proposition 3 There exists a smooth C2,4 solution of
c˜Y = −2α+ 1
α+ 1
λc˜c˜R +
σ2
2(α+ 1)c˜
1
α
c˜RR (2.21)
with initial value
c˜(0, R) =
(
A(R)σ2
2λα
) α
α+1
(2.22)
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which satisfies
inf
(Y,R)∈R+0 ×R
c˜(Y,R) = inf
(Y,R)∈R
c˜(0, R) =: c˜min =
(
Aminσ
2
2λα
) α
α+1
(2.23)
sup
(Y,R)∈R+0 ×R
c˜(Y,R) = sup
(Y,R)∈R
c˜(0, R) =: c˜max =
(
Amaxσ
2
2λα
) α
α+1
(2.24)
Proof: We want to apply the previous results, but unlike the first three conditions, the
last condition of Theorem 3 is not trivial. We first build a function f and forced it to
satisfy all the conditions. Then using Theorem 3 we show its solution satisfies (2.21).
Let’s define the smooth nonnegative functions h1(u), h2(u) and h3(u) which are bounded
away from zero and infinity and for c˜min ≤ u ≤ c˜max satisfy the following equations
h1(u) =
σ2
2(α+ 1)
1
u
1
α
(2.25)
h2(u) =
2α+ 1
α+ 1
λu (2.26)
h3(u) =
σ2
2(α+ 1)
1
u1+
1
α
(2.27)
Now the following functions satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3
a(x, t, u, p) :=
σ2
2(α+ 1)
p
u
1
α
(2.28)
b(x, t, u, p) :=
2α+ 1
α+ 1
λup+
σ2
2(α+ 1)
p2
u1+
1
α
(2.29)
ψ0(x) :=
(
A(R)σ2
2λα
) α
α+1
(2.30)
And therefore the following PDE has a smooth solution in C2,4
ft = −h2(f)fx + h1(f)fxx where f(0, x) = ψ0(x)
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Now we show that the function f is also a solution to our desired PDE, by relabeling from
c(Y,R) to f(x, t).
c˜Y = −2α+ 1
α+ 1
λc˜c˜R +
σ2
2(α+ 1)c˜
1
α
c˜RR (2.31)
This boils down to show that c˜min ≤ f(x, t) ≤ c˜max. First, assume there is a point (t0, x0)
such that f(t0, x0) > c˜max. Then there are N > 0 and γ > 0 such that for the new function
f˜N := fN (t, x)e
−γt(where fN is the function constructed in the proof of Theorem 3)
f˜N := fN (t0, x0)e
−γt0 > c˜max
By construction, this function will attain its maximum at a point (t1, x1) which does not
lay on the boundary at {0} × [−N,N ] and [0, t0]× {N,−N}. Therefore
f˜N,t(t1, x1) ≥ 0 (2.32)
f˜N,x(t1, x1) = 0 (2.33)
f˜N,xx(t1, x1) ≤ 0 (2.34)
On the other hand
f˜N,t =e
−γtfN,t − γe−γtfN (2.35)
=− e−γth2(fN )fN,x + e−γth1(fN )fN,xx − γe−γtfN (2.36)
=− h2(fN )f˜N,x + h1(fN )f˜N,xx − γf˜N (2.37)
Therefore, from equations (2.33) and (2.34) we have
f˜N (t1, x1) ≤ 0
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But this is a contradiction, since
f˜N (t1, x1) ≥ f˜N (t0, x0) ≥ c˜max ≥ 0 (2.38)
By a similar argument, we could reach to a contradiction for the other case, where
f(t0, x0) < c˜min

Proposition 4 There exists a C2,4 solution ω˜ : R+0 × R→ R to the transport equation
ω˜Y = −λc˜ω˜R (2.39)
with initial value
ω˜(0, R) = u(R) (2.40)
the solution is increasing in R, decreasing in Y , and also satisfies
0 ≥ ω˜(Y,R) ≥ u(R− λc˜maxY ) (2.41)
Proof: The proof uses the method of characteristics. Consider the function
P : (Y, S) ∈ R+0 × R 7→ P (Y, S) ∈ R
satisfying the ODE
PY (Y, S) = λc˜(Y, P (Y, S)) (2.42)
with initial value condition P (0, S) = S. Since c˜ is smooth and bounded, for each fixed S
a unique solution to the ODE (2.42) exists. From Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem on ODEs for
30
every Y , P (Y, . ) is a C4−diffeomorphism mapping R onto R, getting the same regularity
as c˜, i.e., P belongs to C2,4. Define
ω˜(Y,R) = u(S) iff P (Y, S) = R
Then ω˜ is a C2,4 function satisfying the initial value condition, and by definition
0 =
d
dY
ω˜
(
Y, P (Y, S)
)
(2.43)
=ω˜R
(
Y, P (Y, S)
)
PY (Y, S) + ω˜Y
(
Y, P (Y, S)
)
(2.44)
=ω˜R
(
Y, P (Y, S)
)
λc˜
(
Y, P (Y, S)
)
+ ω˜Y
(
Y, P (Y, S)
)
(2.45)
(2.46)
Therefore ω˜ satisfies the desired partial differential equation. Since c˜ ≤ c˜max, by construc-
tion P (Y, S) ≤ S + λc˜maxY , and hence ω˜(Y,R) ≥ u(R− λc˜maxY ).
Using positivity of c˜, the family of solutions of the ODE above do not cross. This yields
the monotonicity statement in the proposition. 
Lemma 1 The following equality holds
ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
+ αc˜
α+1
α = 0 (2.47)
Proof: Consider the following linear PDE with initial condition f(0, R) = 0.
fY = −λc˜fR + λc˜Rf (2.48)
From the assumptions on u, the functions c˜ and c˜R are smooth and hence locally Lipschitz.
Therefore, the PDE has a unique solution which turns out to be the constant zero function.
On the other hand, we can show that the function f(Y,R) := αc˜
α+1
α + ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
is also a
solution to this PDE. After proving this, the uniqueness of the solution implies the result.
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First, using the previous lemma and the fact that ω˜ is C2,4, we have
∂
∂Y
(
ω˜RRσ
2
2λω˜R
) =
σ2
2λ
( ω˜RRY ω˜R − ω˜RRω˜RY
ω˜2R
)
(2.49)
=
σ2
2λ
( ω˜Y RRω˜R − ω˜RRω˜Y R
ω˜2R
)
(2.50)
=
σ2
2λ
(−(λc˜ω˜R)RR
ω˜R
+
ω˜RR(λc˜ω˜R)R
ω˜2R
)
(2.51)
=− σ2 c˜ω˜RRR + 2c˜Rω˜RR + c˜RRω˜R
2ω˜R
+ σ2
ω˜RR(c˜Rω˜R + c˜ω˜RR)
2ω˜R
2 (2.52)
=− σ2c˜R ω˜RR
2ω˜R
− σ
2
2
c˜RR + (
ω˜2RR
ω˜2R
− ω˜RRR
ω˜R
)
σ2c˜
2
(2.53)
=− σ2c˜R ω˜RR
2ω˜R
− σ
2
2
c˜RR − σ2c˜ ∂
∂R
ω˜RR
2ω˜R
(2.54)
On the other hand, from Proposition 4
∂
∂Y
(αc˜
α+1
α ) = (α+ 1)c˜
1
α c˜Y = (α+ 1)c˜
1
α
(
− 2α+ 1
α+ 1
λc˜c˜R +
σ2
2(α+ 1)c˜
1
α
c˜RR
)
(2.55)
Now we can easily check that
∂
∂Y
(
αc˜
α+1
α +
ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
)
= −λc˜ ∂
∂R
(
αc˜
α+1
α +
ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
)
− λc˜R
(
αc˜
α+1
α +
ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
)
(2.56)
Hence, the function f(Y,R) := αc˜
α+1
α + ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
satisfies the PDE (2.48) 
Proposition 5 With Q(X) defined in equation (2.12), the value function ω(X,R) :=
ω˜(Q(X), R) solves the HJB equation
min
c
[
− 1
2
σ2X2νRR + λνR|c|1+αq(X) + νXc
]
= 0 (2.57)
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Proof: By Proposition 4 ω˜R > 0. Hence the function
Θ(c) = −1
2
σ2X2ωRR + λωR|c|1+αq(X) + ωXc (2.58)
is convex and attains its minimum at
c∗ =
( −ωX
(1 + α)λq(X)ωR
) 1
α
(2.59)
Therefore, we need to show that Θ(c∗) = 0. (We drop the absolute value because from
Proposition 4, ωX < 0 ), we have
Θ(c∗) =− 1
2
σ2X2ωRR + λq(X)ωR|c∗|1+α + ωXc∗ (2.60)
=− 1
2
σ2X2ωRR +
( −ωX
(1 + α)λq(X)ωR
λωRq(X) + ωX
)
c∗ (2.61)
=− 1
2
σ2X2ωRR +
α
1 + α
ωX
( −ωX
(1 + α)λq(X)ωR
) 1
α
(2.62)
=− 1
2
σ2X2ωRR − αλq(X)− 1αωR
( −ωX
(1 + α)λωR
)1+ 1
α
(2.63)
=− λX2ωR
(
ωRRσ
2
2ωRλ
+
α
X2q(X)
1
α
( −ωX
(1 + α)λωR
)1+ 1
α
)
(2.64)
From the definition of ω(X,R)
ωX = (α+ 1)X
2α
α+1 q(X)
1
α+1 ω˜X
ωR = ω˜R
Therefore (2.64) can be written as
−X2λω˜R
(
ω˜RRσ
2
2ω˜Rλ
+ α
(−ω˜X
λω˜R
)α+1
α
)
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Which by Lemma 4 is equal to zero.

Remark 2 Using Proposition 4, we can rewrite the optimal policy (2.59) as
c(X,R) =
[ X2
q(X)
] 1
α+1
c˜(Q(X), R)
1
α (2.65)
The boundedness result on c˜ in Proposition 3 and even weaker assumptions than being
bounded away from zero and infinity for q(X), could insure that this policy belongs to
X1.(One just needs to insure that all the admissibility requirements in Definition 4 are
satisfied.)
Before starting the verification arguments, we complete our package of boundedness
tools with the following lemma:
Lemma 2 There are positive constants a0 , a1 , a2 , a3 and a4 such that
u(R) ≥ ω(X,R) ≥ u(R) exp(a0Q(X)) (2.66)
0 ≤ ωR(X,R) ≤ a1 + a2 exp(−a3R+ a4Q(X)) (2.67)
for all (X,R) ∈ R+0 × R.
Proof: From monotonicity of ω˜ with respect to X and R, and its boundary condition
via Proposition 4, the left-hand side of the both inequalities follow.
For the right-hand side of (2.66), since A(R) is bounded from above by Amax
u(R−∆) ≥ u(R) exp(Amax∆) (2.68)
Now by (2.41), we can establish the other part of the first inequality with a0 = λcmaxAmax
as follows
ω(X,R) = ω˜(Q(X), R) ≥ u(R− λc˜maxQ(X)) ≥ u(R) exp(λc˜maxAmaxQ(X))
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For the second inequality, first note that ωR = ω˜R. From Lemma 1, we have
− ω˜RR
ω˜R
<
2αλc˜
α+1
α
max
σ2
= Amax (2.69)
Hence
∫ R1
R
− ω˜RR(Y,R2)
ω˜R(Y,R2)
dR2 ≤
∫ R1
R
AmaxdR2 (2.70)
− ln ω˜R(Y,R2)
∣∣∣∣R1
R
≤ Amax(R1 −R) (2.71)
ω˜R(Y,R1) ≥ ω˜R(Y,R)e−Amax(R1−R) (2.72)∫ R3
R
ω˜R(Y,R1)dR1 ≥
∫ R3
R
ω˜R(Y,R)e
−Amax(R1−R)dR1 (2.73)
ω˜(Y,R3)− ω˜(Y,R) ≥ ω˜R(Y,R)
Amax
(1− e−Amax(R3−R)) (2.74)
Then by (2.41) limR3→∞ ω˜(Y,R3) = 0 and we have
0 ≥ ω˜(Y,R) + ω˜R(Y,R)
Amax
Thus
ω˜R(Y,R) ≤ −ω˜(Y,R)Amax ≤ −u(R− λc˜maxY )Amax
And since u(R) is bounded by an exponential function, we can obtain the desired bound
for ω˜R. 
2.3.2 Verification
We now connect the PDE results in previous section with the optimal stochastic control
problem in the section 2.2.2. In order to make the connection between these two, we need
to define a new value function. We assume that the investor trades the risky asset in order
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to maximize the asymptotic expected utility of the portfolio value, i.e.
ν2(X0, R0) := sup
ξ∈X
lim
t→∞E[u(R
ξ
t )] (2.75)
Note that our assumptions on the admissible strategies in maximization of asymptotic
portfolio value are even weaker than those for optimal liquidation (the supremum in (2.75)
is taken over a larger set). In particular, we don’t require Rξt or X
ξ
t to converge at infinity.
Moreover, through out this section we frequently use the second property in Definition 4
for admissibility. This equipped with usual assumptions on q(x) are crucial in simplifying
the upcoming proofs. For any admissible strategy ξ ∈ X , define the sequence of stopping
times
τ ξk := inf
{
t ≥ 0
∣∣∣ ∫ t
0
q(Xξs )|ξs|1+αds ≥ k
}
where k ∈ N (2.76)
Admissibility of ξ guarantees that P (lim τk = ∞) = 1. We proceed by first showing that
u(Rξt ) and ω(X
ξ
t , R
ξ
t ) fulfill local supermartingale inequalities. Thereafter, we show that
ω(X0, R0) ≥ limt→∞ E[u(Rξt )] with equality for ξ = ξˆ. The next lemma in particular justi-
fies our definition of ν2 in (2.75)
Lemma 3 For any admissible strategy ξ the expected utility E[u(Rξt )] is decreasing in t,
moreover E[u(Rξ
t∧τξk
)] ≥ E[u(Rξt )] .
Proof: Since Rξt−R0 is the difference of the true martingale
∫ t
0 σX
ξ
sdBs and the increasing
process λ
∫ t
0 |ξs|1+αq(Xξs )ds, it satisfies the inequality E[Rξt |Fs] ≤ Rξs for s ≤ t (even though
because of lack of integrability, it may fail to be a supermartingale). Hence, from Jensen’s
inequality for supermartingales E[u(Rξt )] is decreasing.
For the second assertion, let n ≥ k and τm := τ ξm. By adding the martingale
∫ t∧τn
t∧τk X
ξ
sdBs
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to Rξ
t∧τξk
we can deduce once again through Jensen’s inequality
E[u(Rξ
t∧τξk
)] ≥ E
[
u
(
R0 + σ
∫ t∧τn
0
XξsdBs − λ
∫ t∧τk
0
|ξs|1+αq(Xξs )ds
)]
(2.77)
By Levy’s characterization theorem for Brownian motions, the stochastic integral in the
right-hand side could be regarded as a time changed standard Brownian motion
W∫ t
0 X
2
sds
:= Bt (2.78)
With R0 constant and the other terms being bounded due to the stopping time τk, and
u(R) being bounded from below by an exponential function, after sending n to infinity by
dominated convergence theorem the right-hand side decreases to
E
[
u
(
R0 + σ
∫ t
0
XξsdBs − λ
∫ t∧τk
0
|ξs|1+αq(Xξs )ds
)]
(2.79)
Which is clearly equal or larger than E[u(Rξt )]. 
Lemma 4 For any admissible strategy ξ, ω(Xξ, Rξ) is a local supermartingale with local-
izing sequence (τ ξk ).
Proof: For T > t ≥ 0, Ito’s formula yields
ω(XξT , R
ξ
T )− ω(Xξt , Rξt ) = (2.80)∫ T
t
ωR(X
ξ
s , R
ξ
s)σX
ξ
sdBs −
∫ T
t
[
λq(Xξs )|ξs|1+αωR + ξsωX −
1
2
(σXξs )
2ωRR
]
(Xξs , R
ξ
s)ds
(2.81)
By Proposition 5 the latter integral is nonnegative and we obtain
ω(Xξt , R
ξ
t ) ≥ ω(XξT , RξT )−
∫ T
t
ωR(X
ξ
s , R
ξ
s)σX
ξ
sdBs (2.82)
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Using an argument similar to the one in Lemma 3, there exist a constant C1 such that for
s ≤ t ∧ τk
Rξs ≥ −C1(1 + sup
q≤t
|Wq|)
Hence, for the localizing sequence (τk) := (τ
ξ
k ) which we defined in (2.76), from inequal-
ity (2.67) in Lemma 2 for any s ≤ t ∧ τk we have
0 ≤ ωR(Xξs , Rξs) ≤ a1 + a2 exp
(
a3C1
(
1 + sup
q≤t
|Bq|
)
+ a4Q(X
ξ
s )
)
(2.83)
Using Doob’s martingale inequality, all the moments of supq≤t |Bq| are integrable. More-
over, admissibility of ξ guarantees the existence of a bound for other terms in (2.83).
Therefore, the integrand term in (2.82) is L2 integrable and as a result the stochastic inte-
gral in (2.82) is a local martingale. This proves that ω(Xξ, Rξ) is a local supermartingale.

Lemma 5 ξˆ defined via equation (2.65) as
ξˆt = c(X
ξˆ
t , R
ξˆ
t )
is admissible for optimal liquidation and maximization of asymptotic portfolio value prob-
lems, i.e. ξ ∈ X1. Furthermore, ω(X ξˆ, Rξˆ) is a martingale and
ω(X0, R0) = lim
t→∞E
[
u(Rξˆt )
] ≤ ν2(X0, R0) (2.84)
Proof: Admissibility of ξˆ follows from Remark 2. Therefore,
∫∞
0 |ξˆt|1+αdt < K for some
constant K. The choice of ξ = ξˆ vanishes the second integral in (2.80), with τ ξˆK =∞, this
yields the martingale property of ω(X ξˆt , R
ξˆ
t ). Moreover, by taking the infinite limit of time
in equation (2.66)
lim
t→∞u(R
ξˆ
t ) ≥ limt→∞ω(X
ξˆ
t , R
ξˆ
t ) ≥ limt→∞u(R
ξˆ
t ) exp(a0Q(X
ξˆ
t )) (2.85)
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From Remark 2 lim
t→∞X
ξˆ
t = 0 and hence, the left and the right-hand side of (2.85) are equal.
This proves the left-hand side of (2.84). The other part follows from the definition of ν2
in (2.75).

Proposition 6 In the case of asymptotic maximization of the portfolio value, we have
ν2 = ω and ξˆ is the a.s. unique optimal strategy.
Proof: From Lemma 5, we already have ω ≤ ν2. For the other side, let ξ be any admissible
strategy such that
lim
t→∞E
[
u(Rξt )
]
> −∞
For all k, t and ξ, with (τk) := (τ
ξ
k ), Lemma 4 and inequality (2.66) yield
ω(X0, R0) ≥ E
[
ω(Xξt∧τk , R
ξ
t∧τk)
] ≥ E[u(Rξt∧τk) exp(a0Q(Xξt∧τk))]
As in the proof Lemma 3, one could show
lim inf
k→∞
E
[
u(Rξt∧τk) exp(a0Q(X
ξ
t∧τk))
] ≥ lim inf
k→∞
E
[
u(Rξt ) exp(a0Q(X
ξ
t∧τk))
]
= E
[
u(Rξt ) exp(a0Q(X
ξ
t ))
]
And hence,
ω(X0, R0) ≥ E[u(Rξt )] + E[u(Rξt )(exp(a0Q(Xξt ))− 1)]
We claim that the second argument on the right attains values arbitrarily close to zero.
Accepting this claim for a moment, we get
ω(X0, R0) ≥ lim
t→∞E[u(R
ξ
t )]
Then, taking the supremum over all the admissible strategies ξ gives ω ≥ ν2. The optimality
of ξˆ follows from Lemma 5 and uniqueness from the fact that c is the unique solution to
the HJB equation (2.57).
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Before addressing the claim, we prove some boundedness results. From Assumption 1, we
have
AminuR ≤ −uRR ≤ AmaxuR
By integration and using the end point behavior of u(R), we conclude
Aminu ≤ −uR ≤ Amaxu (2.86)
This gives the required bound for uR, which we need later to conclude the L
2 property of
the stochastic integral (2.89). Moreover, by substituting uRRA(R) for the middle term in the
previous inequality, we can conclude that for a5 := AminAmax
0 ≥ u(R) ≥ a5uRR(R) (2.87)
Now we can prove the claim. From Lemma 3, for all k, t and (τ) := (τ ξk ) we have
−∞ < lim
s→∞E[u(R
ξ
s)] ≤ E[u(Rξt )] ≤ E[u(Rξt∧τk)] (2.88)
= u(R0) + E
[ ∫ t∧τk
0
uR(R
ξ
s)σX
ξ
s dBs
]
(2.89)
− E
[ ∫ t∧τk
0
λ|ξs|1+αq(Xξs )uR(Rξs)−
1
2
(σXξs )
2uRR(R
ξ
s) ds
]
(2.90)
= u(R0)− E
[ ∫ t∧τk
0
λ|ξs|1+αq(Xξs )uR(Rξs)−
1
2
(σXξs )
2uRR(R
ξ
s) ds
]
(2.91)
Sending k and t to infinity yields
∫ ∞
0
E[(Xξs )
2uRR(R
ξ
s)]ds > −∞ (2.92)
On the other hand, using admissibility of ξ, there is a constant a6 such that
exp(a0Q(X
ξ
t ))− 1 ≤ a6a0(Xξt )2
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Hence, by using (2.87)
0 ≥ E[u(Rξt )(exp(a0Q(Xξt ))− 1)] ≥ E[a0a5a6uRR(Rξt )(Xξt )2]
Therefore by (2.92) the right-hand side of the above equation attains values arbitrarily
close to zero. 
Proposition 7 In the case of the optimal liquidation problem, we have ν1 = ω and the
a.s. unique optimal strategy is given by ξˆ respectively c.
Proof: For any strategy ξ that is admissible for optimal liquidation, the martingale
σ
∫
XsdBs is uniformly integrable due to the third requirement in Definition 4. There-
fore, similar as in the proof of Lemma 3, it follows that E[u(Rξt )] ≥ E[u(Rξ∞)]. Hence
Proposition 6 yields
E[u(Rξ∞)] = lim
t→∞E[u(R
ξ
t )] ≤ ν2(X0, R0) ≤ ω(X0, R0)
Taking the supremum over all admissible strategies ξ, we have ν1 ≤ ω. The converse
inequality follows from the left-hand side of (2.66) and Lemma 5. 
Chapter 3
Dynamic impact
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we derive optimal liquidation policies in a model with dynamic price impact.
In this model we allow temporary price impact to evolve according to the past trades, with
increase in intense trading and decaying overtime in its absent. This change accounts for
the fact that the market’s depth varies subject to the intensity of submitted orders, where
high intensity trading tends to reduce the market depth while in the absent of trading, it
recovers its equilibrium position throughout time. This model generalizes the Almgren and
Chriss (1999) model in a different dimension by incorporating the idea of resilience in the
market in describing the dynamic of temporary price impact. We find the optimal execution
policy and show that unlike some choices in the old models involving resilience, our model
doesn’t allow for Transaction-triggered price manipulation strategies, i.e policies involving
intermediate buying from the same stock in a liquidation problem could not be optimal.
We study the problem only for the case of a buyer investor. The results could be applied to
a seller investor as well. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
after introducing our price impact model, we discuss the admissibility criterion and present
the main result for the investor under finite time horizon constrained case. We prove the
related results using Calculus of Variations techniques to find necessary conditions for the
minimizing path and identify the unique solution to this minimization problem. In the last
section, we study the non-time constrained case as a limiting solution to the finite horizon
case and investigate its connection to the result of Schied and Schneborn (2009).
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 The Market
We consider the liquidation problem, for a trader who wants to sell a specific number of
shares denoted by x0 in a given time T . The liquidation strategy of the investor can be
described by x(t), representing the number of shares hold by him at time t ∈ [0, T ].
Due to our form of penalization for intense trading, we can rule out noncontinuous liq-
uidation strategy. Hence, from the start we can only focus on continuous paths. Moreover,
we go one step further and assume that the trading policy x(t) is absolutely continuous.
This not only will help us in ruling out unrealistic case like Cantor function for trading
policy function, but also through existence of the derivative function almost surely, as an
alternative we can represent the investor’s trading strategy by c(t) = −x′(t) and refer to
his trading intensity.
x(t) = x0 −
∫ t
0
c(s)ds (3.1)
The investor’s objective is to liquidate all the shares, i.e. x(T ) = 0 i.e.
∫ T
0 c(t)dt = x0. Due
to insufficient liquidity in the market, the investor’s trading moves the market price against
him. We use the Almgren-Chriss framework to demonstrate this trading impact. This
model consists of two component. A permanent impact which affects the price through the
number of sold shares and independently of the investor’s trading intensity. We follow the
price manipulation theorem of Huberman and Stanzl (2004) which requires the permanent
price impact to be a linear function. We use the constant γ to demonstrate it. Furthermore,
there exist a temporary price impact which affects the infinitesimal orders relative to the
intensity of trading and vanishes instantaneously. Unlike the older model of Schied and
Schneborn (2009), where temporary price impact λ is a constant, we consider the following
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dynamic for the temporary price impact
λ′ = −αλ+ βc (3.2)
Where the positive coefficients α and β stand for the resilience in the market and the linear
drift which capture the effect of the past trades on the temporary price impact respectively.
In addition to the large investor’s impact, the price process P is driven by a Brownian
motion with volatility σ. Hence, the execution price is given by
P (t) = P0 + σB(t) + γ
(
x(t)− x(0))− λ(t)x′(t) (3.3)
Where λ(t) with initial value λ0, is given by
λ(t) = e−αt
(
λ0 +
∫ t
0
c(s)eαsds
)
(3.4)
Remark 3 With Bachelier model for price and existence of permanent and temporary price
impact, the execution price could take negative value. In order to simplify the notation, we
don’t restrict our assumption as much as we can, however we always assume that the price
is positive.
3.2.2 Optimal Policy
Consider a Von-Neumann-Morgenstern investor with constant absolute risk aversion. In
other words, for some constants A,B > 0 his utility function is given by u(r) = −Be−Ar.
The investor’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of his terminal revenue over
the set of all admissible trading strategies.
Definition 5 We parametrize the trading strategies with progressively measurable processes
ξ(t) = −x′(t). We call a process admissible if c ∈ L2[0, T ]. Furthermore, due to the
relationship between c and λ from equation (3.4) we require that for the resulting process
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λξ(t) ≥ 0
The assumption on λ is crucial for the existence of the solution. By allowing negative values
for λ one could simply gain infinite wealth by extreme back and forth trading in a very short
time while keeping λ < 0. After excluding this possibility, the other assumption excludes
all the strategies with infinite lost. The process ct determines the other two processes xξ(t)
and λξ(t) which are adopted to the same filtration, uniquely throughout equations (3.1)
and (3.4).
The resulting cash position for admissible policy ξ is given by
R(t) =
∫ t
0
ξsPsds = P0x0 − γ
2
x20 + σ
∫ t
0
xξ(s)dB(s)−
∫ t
0
λξ(s)ξ
2(s)ds
−
(
P0xξ(t) +
γ
2
[x2ξ(t)− 2x0xξ(t)] + σxξ(t)B(t)
)
(3.5)
Since price is positive, in order to maximize this revenue, the investor is required to liquidate
his entire position by time T , i.e. xξ(t) = 0. Hence, the resulting cash flow of such trading
strategy ξ is given by
RT (ξ) = P0x0 − γ
2
x20 +
∫ T
0
σxξ(s)dB(s)−
∫ T
0
λξ(s)c
2
ξ(s)ds (3.6)
By admissibility assumption c ∈ L2, the stochastic integral in (3.6) is martingale. Hence,
the terminal wealth has a Gaussian distribution and the expected value of the investor’s
utility function is
E[−Be−ARξ(T )] = −B exp(−A(E[Rξ(T )] + 1
2
AVar[Rξ(T )]
)
)
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This means that the maximization problem is equivalent to minimization problem of the
trading cost. Consisting of two components, the price impact cost and volatility cost
∫ T
0
λξ(s)c
2
ξ(s)ds+
∫ T
0
1
2
Aσ2x2ξ(s)dB(s) (3.7)
The challenge for the investor is to find a balance in the tradeoff between these two com-
ponent.
3.2.3 Statement of main results
We present all the result for finite horizon case in the following statement
Theorem 4 For an investor with a constant risk aversion A who is required to liquidate
x0 number of shares, in a finite horizon time interval [0, T ]
i) There exist an optimal liquidation policy which maximize the expected value of his
terminal utility.
ii) The optimal policy is given by
x(t) = −αu(t) + u
′(t)
αβ
where u(t) is a solution to the ODE
−Aα3σ2u+Aασ2u′′ − 6α2u′u′′ + 4u′′u(3) + 2u′u(4) = 0 (3.8)
with initial conditions
u(0) =λ0 + βx0 (3.9)
u′(0) =− αλ0 (3.10)
u′(T ) =− αu(T ) (3.11)
α2u′(T )2 − u′′(T )2 − 2αu′(T )u′′(T )− 2u′(T )u′′′(T ) = 0 (3.12)
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iii) The optimal policy is unique.
iv) Although the model allows for intermediate buying, one cannot improve the trading
performance through such policies.
Theorem 5 In infinite time horizon environment, the optimal policy is given via
c(x, λ) = xH(x, λ)
where H(x, λ) is the unique solution of the quasilinear partial differential equation
xHHx + (αλ+ βxH)Hλ =
Aσ2βx
4λ2
+
Aσ2
2λ
− αH −H2 (3.13)
with boundary condition
lim
x→0
H(x, λ) =
√
Aσ2
2λ
K0(
√
2Aσ2
α2λ
)
K1(
√
2Aσ2
α2λ
)
where K0 and K1 are modified Bessel function.
3.3 Proof of Results
3.3.1 Finite horizon case
Remark 4 Since all the cost functions are positive, after finishing the liquidation task
before the terminal time, the investor could only increase his trading cost by back and forth
trading. Hence, we could restrict the set of admissible policies to those which doesn’t end
with buying, i.e. c(T ) ≥ 0.
Proof: [proof of Theorem 4 part (i)] We use the direct method of calculus of variations
to show the existence of the solution. Consider a minimizing sequence {ξn} of admissible
liquidation policies for execution cost. Since trading cost is a non-negative function, such
47
a sequence exists. By L2 property of admissibility there exists a subsequence {ξni}which
converge weakly to an element c˜ ∈ L2. From weak convergence for any t ∈ [0, T ]
x˜(s) :=
∫ t
0
c˜(s)ds = lim
ni→∞
∫ t
0
cni(s)ds = xni(s)
Hence, we have the pointwise convergence of xni almost surely. In particular x˜(T ) = x0,
hence c˜ is also an admissible policy which liquidates all the required number of shares. The
final task is to show that the liquidation cost from the limiting policy c is no more than
the limit of costs. First, for the volatility cost, using Fatou’s lemma for the a.s. pointwise
convergence sequence of {xi}, we have
∫ T
0
Aσ2x2(t)dt ≤ lim
ni→∞
∫ T
0
Aσ2x2ni(t)dt
For price impact cost, by weak convergence for any set A ∈ [0, T ] we have
∫ T
0
1A(t)c
2(t)dt ≤ lim inf
ni→∞
∫ T
0
1A(t)c
2
ni(t)dt (3.14)
Therefore to complete the proof we need to show that the sequence {λni} converges uni-
formly. Equivalently, we show the uniform convergence of the sequence {λni(t)eαt}. From
Holder inequality
λi(t1)e
αt1 − λi(t2)eαt2 =
∫ T
0
cni(s)e
αs1(t1,t2)(s)ds ≤
(∫ T
0
c2nids
) 1
2
(∫ T
0
(
1(t1,t2)(s)e
αs
)2
ds
) 1
2
With the first term being bounded due to admissibility. We conclude that {λni} are
equicontinous and therefore by Arzela-Ascoli theorem there exist a subsequence subse-
quence {ξmi} of {ξni} such that {λmj} are uniformly convergent. For each i ∈ {mj} the
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following equation holds.
∫ T
0
λic
2
i ds =
∫ T
0
(λi − λ)c2i +
∫ T
0
λ(c2i − c2) +
∫ T
0
λc2
After taking the limit, from uniformly convergence of λmj to λ, and ci being bounded in
L2 the first integral on the right approaches to zero. So it’s sufficient to show that
lim inf
i
∫ T
0
λ(c2i − c2) ≥ 0
Which from positivity of λ and inequality (3.14) follows. 
Proof: [proof of Theorem 4 part (ii)] We face a minimization problem for the func-
tional (3.7) in the space of continuous functions with the fixed endpoints x(0) = x0 and
x(T ) = 0. Since λ(t) is a function of x′ over [0, t), we define the following control variable
to use the method of calculus of variations
u(t) := λ(t) + βx(t)
From equation (3.2) we can write all the variables of the objective function in terms of u
λ(t) = −u
′(t)
α
(3.15)
x(t) = −αu(t) + u
′(t)
αβ
(3.16)
c(t) =
αu′(t) + u′′(t)
αβ
(3.17)
from initial condition at time zero for λ and x, any admissible path has to satisfy the
following initial conditions
u(0) = λ0 + βx0 (3.18)
u′(0) = −αλ0 (3.19)
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Moreover, since the liquidation is done by time T , the following terminal condition holds
as well
u′(T ) = −αu(T ) (3.20)
We can now write the cost function under this new variable
−
∫ T
0
u′(t)
(
αu′(t) + u′′(t)
)2
dt+
1
2
Aασ2
∫ T
0
(
αu(t) + u′(t)
)2
dt (3.21)
Hence, the objective is to maximize the functional J [u] =
∫ T
0 L(u, u
′, u′′)dt, where
L(u, u′, u′′) = u′
(
αu′ + u′′
)2 − 1
2
Aασ2
(
αu+ u′
)2
(3.22)
From calculus of variation, we know that for the optimal policy, the first order variation of
a candidate function u has to be zero, so for u and u+ h we have
∆J = J [u+ h]− J [u] =
∫ T
0
L(u+ h, u′ + h′, u′′ + h′′)− L(u, u′, u′′)
As h goes to zero
δJ =
∫ T
0
(
Luh+ Lu′h
′ + Lu′′h′′
)
dt
Using the integration by parts for the last term we have
δJ [h] =
∫ (
Luh+ Lu′h
′ − d
dt
Lu′′h
′
)
dt+
(
Lu′′h
′
)∣∣∣∣T
0
By using the integration by parts once again, this time for h′ terms, we have
δJ [h] =
∫ (
Lu − d
dt
Lu′ +
d2
dt2
Lu′′
)
hdt +
(
Lu′′h
′
)∣∣∣∣T
0
+ (Lu′ − d
dt
Lu′′)h
∣∣∣∣T
0
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From calculus of variation, we know that for the optimal policy δJ [h] = 0. Therefore
Lu − d
dt
Lu′ +
d2
dt2
Lu′′ = 0 (3.23)
Also for any h in such a way that u+ h be an admissible policy, we have
(
Lu′′h
′
)∣∣∣∣T
0
+ (Lu′ − d
dt
Lu′′)h
∣∣∣∣T
0
= 0 (3.24)
The first equation which is the Euler-Lagrange equation for L(u, u′, u′′) in (3.22) is the
following
2
[
u(3)
(
αu′ + u′′
)
+ u′
(
αu(3) + u(4)
)
+ 2u′′
(
αu′′ + u(3)
)]−Aα2σ2(αu+ u′)
−
[
2αu′′
(
αu′ + u′′
)
+ 2αu′
(
αu′′ + u(3)
)
+ 2
(
αu′ + u′′
)
(αu′′ + u(3)
)−Aασ2(αu′ + u′′)] = 0
Which after simplification is equal to
−Aα3σ2u+Aασ2u′′ − 6α2u′u′′ + 4u′′u(3) + 2u′u(4) = 0 (3.25)
On the other hand, for equation (3.24), since u+h satisfies the initial conditions (3.18), (3.19)
and (3.20) as well
h(0) = h′(0) = 0
−αh(T ) = h′(T )
Hence, we can rewrite (3.24) as following
−αLu′′ + (Lu′ − d
dt
Lu′′)
∣∣∣∣
T
= 0
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Which gives the following condition at the terminal time T
α2u′2 − u′′2 − 2αu′u′′ − 2u′u(3) −Aασ2(αu+ u′)∣∣∣∣
T
= 0,
and via the terminal condition (3.20) is equivalent to
α2u′(T )2 − u′′(T )2 − 2αu′(T )u′′(T )− 2u′(T )u(3)(T ) = 0. (3.26)

After proving the existence and the form of the solution in theorems, now we need to
prove the uniqueness. First we prove the following proposition
Lemma 6 The solution to ODE (3.8) can be written in terms of x and λ in the following
form
2λ(t)λ′′(t) + λ′2(t)− 3α2λ2(t) +K(t) = 0 (3.27)
where K(t) given recursively for t ≤ T by following
Kξ(t) = 2αλ(T )(λ′(T ) + αλ(T )) +Aσ2β
(
x(t) + α
∫ T
t
x(s)ds
)
is a positive function.
Proof: Let’s write (3.25) in terms of λ and x
−6α2λλ′ + 4λ′λ′′ + 2λλ(3) = Aσ
2
α
(α2u− u′′)
The left-hand side is equal to
d
dt
(
2λλ′′ + λ′2 − 3α2λ2
)
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Therefore, for t ≤ T we have
(
2λλ′′ + λ′2 − 3α2λ2
)∣∣∣∣T
t
=
Aσ2
α
∫ T
t
(α2u(s)− u′′(s))ds
This gives
2λ(t)λ′′(t) + λ′2(t)− 3α2λ2(t) =
(2λ(T )λ′′(T ) + λ′2(T )− 3α2λ2(T ))− Aσ
2
α
∫ T
t
(α2u(s)− u′′(s))ds (3.28)
By writing the equation (3.26) in terms of λ
2λ(T )λ′′(T ) = α2λ2(T )− λ′2(T )− 2αλ(T )λ′(T ) (3.29)
Using this expression for the first term in the right hand side of the equation (3.28), we
have
2λ(T )λ′′(T ) + λ′2(T )− 3α2λ2(T ) = −2αβλ(T )(αλ(T ) + λ′(T ))
The last term in the parentheses is c(T ) which by Lemma 4 is positive. On the other hand,
from equations (3.16) and (3.17)
∫ T
t
(α2u(s)− u′′(s))ds = αβ
∫ T
t
(αx(s)− x′(s))ds = αβ(x(t) + ∫ T
t
αx(s)ds
)

Proof: [proof of Theorem 4 part (iii)] To show that the solution to the ODE (3.8) is the
unique minimizer of the functional (3.21), we need to show that
δ2J < 0
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The second variation of the functional J [u] is given by
1
2
∫ T
0
(
Luuh
2 + Lu′u′h
′2 + Lu′′u′′h′′
2)
dt+
∫ T
0
(
Luu′hh
′ + Lu′′u′h′′h′ + Luu′′hh′′
)
dt
Using integration by parts for terms in the second integral and noting that Luu′′ = 0 we
can write the second order variation as
1
2
∫ T
0
[(
Luu− d
dt
Luu′
)
h2 +
(
Lu′u′ − d
dt
Lu′′u′
)
h′2 +Lu′′u′′h′′
2
]
dt+
1
2
Luu′h
2
∣∣∣∣T
0
+
1
2
Lu′′u′h
′2
∣∣∣∣T
0
(3.30)
Since u and u+ h both satisfy conditions (3.18) and (3.19) we have
h(0) = h′(0) = 0
Hence, it’s sufficient to show that every term in the expression (3.30) of the second order
variation is negative. For the first term in the integral have
Luu − d
dt
Luu′ = −Aα3σ2 < 0 (3.31)
For the second term, from Lemma 6 we have
Lu′u′ − d
dt
Lu′′u′ = 6α
2u′ − 2u(3) −Aσ2α (3.32)
which can be represented in terms of λ as follow
−6α3λ+ 2αλ′′ −Aασ2 (3.33)
Multiplying this by λα , adding it to (3.27) and using the positivity of K(t) in Lemma 6 we
conclude that (3.32) is strictly negative. For the last integrand
Lu′′u′′ = 2u
′ (3.34)
54
Which from equation (3.15) and positivity of λ is clearly negative.
For the last two terms which are evaluated at T . We have
Luu′
∣∣
T
= −Aα2σ3 (3.35)
Lu′′u′
∣∣
T
= 2u′′(T ) + 4αu′(T ) (3.36)
Negativity of the second term follows from Lemma after rewriting it in terms of λ and c
using equations (3.15), (3.17) and Remark 4.

Proof: [proof of Theorem 4 part (iv)] Let’s write the equation (3.27) in the following
form
2λc′ + c(λ′ − 3αλ) +K(t) = 0 (3.37)
Suppose the solution given in part (i) suggests to the investor to buy intermediately. With
the final goal being to reach x(T ) = 0, there exists a point in time t0 such that x
′(t0) = 0
and x′′(t0) < 0, i.e. c′(t0) > 0. Then in equation (3.37) at time t0 the first term in is
positive and the second one is zero. But this is a contradiction since from Lemma 6 K(t)
is always positive. 
3.3.2 Infinite horizon case
Now we discuss the optimal execution problem for an investor with no time constraint. For
a moment, let’s ignore the risk component by assuming A = 0 . In this case any admissible
policy could be improved by delaying the policy and hence, and hence there is no optimal
policy in this case. However, under risk consideration, the problem is not trivial anymore.
Before studying the problem, let’s first recall the Schied-Schoneborn results, which gives
an intuition for the choices we make in the next proofs.
Theorem 6 [Schied and Schneborn (2009)] In a model where execution price evolves as
equation (3.3), under contant temporary price impact λ. The optimal policy of the investor
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is given by
c(t) =
√
Aσ2
2λ
x(t) (3.38)
In order to address the problem for infinite horizon, we look at the limiting behavior of
the solutions in the finite horizon case. The first question is to whether or not the investor
will keep delaying the liquidation till to the end. The next proposition answers to this
question and furthermore provide us with the limiting behavior for we’re required in the
last proof.
Proposition 8 In the absence of time restriction for liquidation in a market with dynamic
temporary price impact, liquidating the entire position in a finite time is never optimal.
Proof: Let’s assume that the optimal liquidation policy c is taking place in the finite time
[0, T ]. We show that this policy could be improved and hence contradict the optimality
claim. Define the function F for x 6= 0 by
F (x, λ) =
c
x√
λ
Since the liquidation is taking place in a finite time, F (x, λ) can’t be bounded. Hence, for
any M there is an interval I = [tM , T ) such that for all t ∈ I
c > M
x√
λ
(3.39)
By looking at the cost function
∫
λc2 +
∫
1
2
Aσ2x2
Over interval I we can see that the cost from price impact is M
2
1
2
Aσ2
times higher than the
volatility risk. We create c˜ through modifying c over this interval, in such a way that it
reduces the price impact much higher than it increases the risk cost. Let J = [tM , T˜ ) be
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the interval with a length N times length of I. Define c˜ as follow
c˜(s) =
1
N
c(tM +
s− tM
N
) ∀s ∈ [tM , T˜ )
Under this choice of liquidation policy, for the volatility cost we have
∫
J
Aσ2x˜2 = N
∫
I
Aσ2x2
Also for price impact cost, over each interval I ′ ⊂ I and its corresponding subset J ′ ⊂ J
we have ∫
J ′
c˜2 =
1
N
∫
I′
c2
Now let’s compare the value of λ and λ˜ over these to intervals. With tI ∈ [tM , T˜ ) and its
corresponding time tJ = tI + (tI − tM )N , we claim that
λtI ≥ λ˜tJ (3.40)
At time t = tM these two are equal. After this point we have
λtI = (λtM +
∫ tI
0
βcse
αsds)e−αtI
λtJ = (λtM +
∫ tJ
0
βc˜se
αsds)e−αtJ
The claim is proven after comparing the derivative of the two integrals. Hence, the liqui-
dation cost can be reduced, which this is a contradiction to the optimality claim. 
Theorem 7 The optimal liquidation policy of an investor with infinite time horizon has
the following dynamic.
αc− c′ = Aσ
2
2
[
β
2
(x
λ
)2
+
x
λ
]
(3.41)
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Proof: For fixed λ(T ) and λ′(T ) define
A(λT ,λ′T )(t) = λT (αλT + λ
′
T ) +
Aσ2
2
(β2x2 + 2βλx) (3.42)
Since A′(t) = λ(t)K ′(t) one can check that the solutions to equation (3.27) are in one to
one correspondence with the solutions of the following differential equation
λ′2 = −K(t) + α2λ2 + A(t)
λ
Combining these two representation, The optimality path can be represented in the fol-
lowing form
α2λ− λ′′ = A(t)
2λ2
Which after writing the left-hand side in terms of the rate of selling is equivalent to
αc− c′ = A(t)
2βλ2
(3.43)
From previous proposition we know that the trader tends to use all the infinite horizon for
optimal trading, therefore, the infinite horizon solution can be obtained by approaching
terminal time to infinity in the finite horizon case. Hence, in the limit at infinity λ(T ) and
λ(T )′ approach to zero and (3.42) becomes
A(t) = Aσ
2
2
(β2x2 + 2βλx)
and hence from (3.43) the infinite horizon optimal policy path satisfies
αc− c′ = Aσ
2
2
[
β
2
(x
λ
)2
+
x
λ
]

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Given a value for c(0) this ODE (3.41) could identifies the liquidation path uniquely,
however, we don’t have any constraint left to find this initial condition. In order to address
this issue, we transform the ODE into a PDE and observe that the initial condition to the
PDE appears naturally in this algebraic form.
Proof: [proof of Theorem 5] With no time constraint, the optimal policy c is only a
function of number of shares and the current temporary price impact parameter, hence by
defining it as c(xt, λt), we have
d
dt
c(x, λ) =
dx
dt
cx +
dλ
dt
cλ
the ODE (3.41) can be written as following in a PDE form
2αc+ 2αλcλ − 2βccλ − Aσ
2
2
βx2
λ2
− Aσ
2x
λ
+ 2ccx = 0
In order to address the singularity at x = 0 and obtain the boundary condition, we rewrite
the PDE for the function
H(x, λ) =
c(x, λ)
x
(3.44)
we obtain
xH + λxHλ − β
α
x2HHλ − Aσ
2
4α
βx2
λ2
− Aσ
2x
2αλ
+
1
α
xH(H + xHx) = 0 (3.45)
Now the singularity of this PDE at x = 0 allows us the to observe its initial condition in
limit at x = 0 as a Riccati equation
Hλ =
Aσ2
2αλ2
− 1
λ
H − 1
αλ
H2 (3.46)
Let’s denote h(λ) = limx→0H(x, λ) and use the prime notation, for derivative with respect
to its argument λ. By using the Riccati transformation, we can write this ODE in the form
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of second order differential equation
y′′ +
2
λ
y′ − Aσ
2
2α2λ3
y = 0 (3.47)
which after solving, will return us the solution to the ODE (3.46) via following transforam-
tion
h(λ) = αλ
y′(λ)
y(λ)
(3.48)
Let’s denote M = 2Aσ
2
α2
> 0. Then for constants C1 and C2 the solutions to (3.47) are
given by
u(λ) =
1√
λ
(
C1f(λ) + C2g(λ)
)
where f(λ) = I1(
√
M/λ) and g(λ) = K1(
√
M/λ) are modified Bessel functions. Let’s
assume for a moment that both C1, C2 are nonzero.
Let’s denote w(λ) = C1f(λ) + C2g(λ). From (3.48) we have
h(λ) = αλ
−12λ−
3
2w(λ) + λ−
1
2w′(λ)
λ−
1
2w(λ)
= α(−1
2
+ λ
w′
w
) (3.49)
From proposition 8, we know limλ→0 h(λ) = ∞ and limλ→∞ h(λ) = 0. Hence, we for the
function w
′
w we need to have
lim
λ→0
w′
w(λ)
=∞ lim
λ→∞
w′
w
≈ 1
2λ
(3.50)
We can observe that for the function f(λ) and g(λ), we have
lim
λ→∞
f(λ) = lim
λ→∞
f ′(λ) = 0 lim
λ→0
f(λ) > 0
lim
λ→0
g(λ) = lim
λ→0
f ′(λ) = 0 lim
λ→∞
g(λ) > 0
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Hence, from these results we have
lim
λ→∞
w′
w
= lim
λ→∞
C1f
′(λ) + C2g′(λ)
C1f(λ) + C2g(λ)
= lim
λ→∞
C2g
′(λ)
C2g(λ)
= lim
λ→∞
g′(λ)
g(λ)
lim
λ→0
w′
w
= lim
λ→0
C1f
′(λ) + C2g′(λ)
C1f(λ) + C2g(λ)
= lim
λ→0
C1f
′(λ)
C1f(λ)
= lim
λ→0
f ′(λ)
f(λ)
However, from the asymptotic behavior of modified Bessel functions we have
lim
λ→∞
f ′(λ)
f(λ)
= −∞
which is contradiction to the boundary condition (3.50). Therefore, either C1 = 0 or
C2 = 0. By the same argument as above, we can immediately see that only with C1 = 0
the initial conditions are satisfied. After simplifying the result in equation (3.49) we obtain
the required initial condition for the solving the PDE (3.45)
lim
x→0
H(x, λ) =
√
Aσ2
2λ
K0(
√
2Aσ2
α2λ
)
K1(
√
2Aσ2
α2λ
)
.

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